In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
In its situatedness, the book offers a valuable resource to feminist and other post-colonial epistemology and ethics projects, with their commitments to locating inquiry, both ethical and epistemological, in the circumstances and among the people where its successes are achieved, its failures and harms enacted, and to counteracting the oppressions to which epistemic injustices have routinely contributed, well before this innovative conceptual apparatus made it possible to name and engage with them as such.
A Little of Her Language.
In this kind of case, Fricker argues that as well as there being an injustice caused by epishemic outcomes such as the speaker missing a promotion at workthere is a testimonial injustice: Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Clearly, then, hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are interconnected in the harms they perform, particularly in their identity-constructive power.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. Fricker steers a careful passage between the Scylla of the one and the Charybdis of the other.
When, for example, the language of “sexual harassment”, “racism”, “homophobia”, or “sexism” had not achieved common currency in the rhetorical spaces of western societies, an frickr range of experiential reports could not claim a hearing or expect communal uptake, in a strong sense of episteemic.
Epistemic Injustice – Paperback – Miranda Fricker – Oxford University Press
Kristie Dotson – – Social Epistemology 28 2: Prejudice In Injkstice Credibility Economy 3. Science Logic and Mathematics. We are also knowers-something that tends to be forgotten by power-obsessed postmodern theorizing. David Coady – – Episteme 7 2: Find it on Scholar.
In so doing it moves epistemology into places where knowing matters to people’s lives, and where formal analyses abstracted from situations and experiences offer minimal guidance for good epistemic conduct.
Nora Berenstain – – Ergo: Testimonial Injustice occurs when a hearer fails, because of prejudice, to give due credit to the word of a speaker. The Laws of Belief Wolfgang Spohn. Most of the book focuses on two such forms — Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice — and on the epistemic virtues required to counteract them.
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The appeal must be to exemplary instances and events in which people have managed to move imaginatively beyond damaging practices and policies, have enlisted a critical mass of like-minded others to initiate the new meanings, the collective political change, the nascent just society, that is the moral-political goal of systematically countering epistemic injustice.
Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Rae Langton – – Hypatia 25 2: Being Realistic about Reasons T. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice.
In its structural modality it is dispersed through the social order where it operates impersonally, almost imperceptibly, yet surely. We are social creatures-something that tends to be forgotten by traditional analytic epistemology. Gloria Origgi – – Social Epistemology 26 2: Gaile Pohlhaus – – Hypatia 27 4: The implications of variability, even relativity, of there being diverse more or less “just” knowledge claims about “the same thing”, of this “negative space” as more and other than a space of error or falsity, would preclude its claims to being taken seriously.
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When such harms go deep, Fricker suggests, people are “prevented from becoming who they are” 5. Print Save Cite Email Share.
Is virtue its own motivation? Thus, with testimonial injustice, speakers are, variously, thwarted in their claims to acknowledgment as subjects of knowledge, and thereby harmed in their self-development.
So far I have concentrated on the first third of the book, which prepares the ground for moving epistemic agency away from dislocated, abstract analyses to situate it naturalistically, socially, and hermeneutically within a virtue epistemological frame where testimony occupies a pivotal place, and matters of variable credibility are centrally at issue.
Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing Epistemoc Fricker Ground-breaking work on a new subject in philosophy Fascinating exploration of the relationship between knowledge and power Virtue epistemology is a hot topic in philosophy.
Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. As a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but to all of the disciplines.
While it is too soon to assert that “new meanings” and their larger injustice-eradicating effects are now securely in place and reliably operative, these conceptual innovations have opened the way toward reconfigured epistemic and ethical engagement with the practices they name, and created spaces for revisionary social-political intervention.
The questions admit of no easy answers and Fricker supplies none, although she rightly insists that a “‘vulgar’ relativist” resistance to passing moral judgement on injutsice cultures “is incoherent” The book explores two different types of knjustice injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. Kusch – – Mind Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a Wpistemic of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
Classical, Early, and Medieval Injusyice History: Indeed, acknowledging the unjust benefits gender or racial prejudice afford to people as members of the dominant sex or race exacts a price: The Virtue of Testimonial Justice 5. Analytic philosophyfeminist philosophy.
Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing – PhilPapers
Even though they may be experienced and performed individually, these are not merely individual harms: There is much to admire in Fricker’s book. Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology. Thus when “some social groups are unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their social experiences”, they are blocked in their efforts to claim recognition for the frickr harms.